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said, instead, that if additur was improper they would remand the case
to the trial court for exercise of its discretion, and not for "judgment on
the verdict"?
As indicated above it appears that the additur procedure denies the
plaintiff his right to trial by jury; however, in light of the remittitur
precedent in North Carolina, our court's decision rests on logical
ground.
NIcK J. MILLER
Constitutional Law-Discretionary Power of the Secretary of State
to Deny Passports
The power of the Secretary of State to deny passports for reasons
other than those established by congressional legislation was rejected
by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Kent v. Dulles.' To under-
stand adequately the problem involved in that case it is necessary to
review briefly the historical and legal background of the present passport
laws.2
Originally, passports were issued by a multiplicity of federal, state,
and local officers.3 A statute4 enacted in 1856 and, with minor amend-
ments, codified in 1926 changed this practice. This statute remains the
basis of the present passport laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
"The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . .
under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe
for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person
shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."
The Secretary assumed that under this statute and the executive order
issued pursuant to it 5 he had the discretionary power to deny a pass-
port. Until recently that power had never been questioned. 6
1357 U.S. 116 (1958).
'This Note will deal with the Secretary's power to deny passports and with
the substantive grounds for such denial. It will consider only incidentally the
related problem of procedural due process in the denial of passports.
' See 357 U.S. at 123.
' 11 STAT. 60 (1856) (later amended by 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a
(1952)).
'Exec. Order No. 7856 (1938), 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.77 (1958). This order
outlined certain procedural rules and in § 51.77 authorized the Secretary to promul-
gate additional regulations not inconsistent therewith.
' The first case mentioning passports in the Supreme Court was Urtetiqui v.
D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835), where the Court, in a frequently quoted
dictum, described the passport as a political document whose issuance was in the
sole discretion of the Secretary. Briefly stated, the basis of the viewpoint thus
expressed was that the inherent power of the Chief Executive to exercise sole
discretion in conducting foreign affairs encompassed the issuance of passports,
because the traveler's activities abroad might conflict with our foreign policy and
because the government was in some measure obligated to protect citizens abroad.
For a good exposition of this point of view, see Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561,
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A passport has never been a prerequisite to travel in peacetime.7 A
1918 statute,8 making it unlawful for a person to leave or enter the
United States without a passport while a presidential proclamation of
war was in force, was so amended 9 early in 1941 that the President might
invoke its provisions in the then-existing emergency. The statute,
altered so that it could be invoked in any national emergency, was re-
enacted in 1952.10 The necessary proclamations were made so that
continuously since 1941 a passport has been a legal prerequisite to exit
from the United States.1 In the light of this requirement, the power of
the Secretary of State to deny passports has assumed a new importance
and has been subjected to a critical re-examination. 12
Beginning in the late 1940's the State Department began rejecting
passport applications on the ground that issuance to the applicant in
question would be "against the best interests" of the United States.'"
This practice was first challenged in Bauer v. Acheson14 where the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia recognized the
constitutional right of a citizen to travel 15 and held that the right could
566-68 (D.C. Cir. 1957). This, combined with the supposed statutory authority
under the cited legislation, was generally thought to give the Secretary a two-fold
basis for his actions.
It is merely a convenience in international travel, its chief use being to
establish the citizenship of the bearer. 357 U.S. at 121. Persons denied a passport
have generally traveled without one.
S40 STAT. 559 (1918). 9 55 STAT. 252 (1941).
1066 STAT. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1952).
' The statute was invoked in 1941 before the United States entered World
War II. Proclamation No. 2523, 55 STAT. 1696 (1941). This period ended in
1952 by Proclamation No. 2974, 66 STAT. C31 (1952). But the provisions of the
statute were extended several times, eventually to April 1, 1953. 66 STAT. 54, 57,
96, 137, 330, 333 (1952). The Korean crisis was declared by Proclamation No.
2914, 64 STAT. A454 (1950). This, however, did not inoke the statute, which
at that time was restricted in its terms to the World War II emergency. The
1952 act, applying to any emergency, was invoked in January, 1953, prior to the
expiration of the statutory extension of the World War II proclamation. Procla-
mation No. 3004, 67 STAT. C31 (1953). Thus the prohibition was continuously
in effect from 1941.
1" Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958);
Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Robeson v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 895 (1956) ; Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532
(D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Dulles v.
Nathan, 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445
(D.D.C. 1952).
13 From the nature of the transaction involved there is no public record of a
number of such "best interests" denials. In most cases it appeared that the
refusal was based on the applicant's membership in the Communist party or his
affiliation with the Communist cause. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952),
for a documented collection of individual instances of such refusals prior to the
first court test.
"' 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952) where plaintiff had her passport revoked
without notice or hearing. The Secretary was ordered to restore it or accord
the plaintiff a hearing.
1" The existence of this right has not been disputed in any of the cases in this
field, yet the courts have some difficulty in finding an authoritative basis for it.
There is no clear historical evidence to rely on for its existence, and the framers
of the Bill of Rights make no mention of it. The cases in general draw heavily
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not be denied without according the citizen the procedural due process
requirements of notice and hearing. Presumably, as a result of this
decision the Secretary promulgated regulations listing membership in
the Communist party or affiliation with the Communist movement as
substantive grounds for denial and establishing administrative pro-
cedures for appeal of passport denials. 18
The first court test of a substantive ground for denial of a passport
was in Shachtman v. Dulles.17 Here the applicant had been given a
"best interests" denial because he was the president of an organization
on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. The court
found that the grounds for denial employed by the Secretary were not
related to foreign affairs on that level which was beyond the power of the
courts to review, generally termed the political level. Thus the Secretary
could not rely solely on his discretion for such denial. Strengthened by
the admission of the Secretary that the passport might have been granted
but for the Attorney General's listing, the court held the denial
arbitrary and thus invalid. It is to be noted that in this case the
Secretary did not rely on any of his written regulations in denying the
passport, so that they were not called into question. The importance of
the case lies in the court's assertion of the right to review the sub-
stantive grounds of a denial and its invalidation of those grounds upon
finding them to be arbitrary and to lie in an area where the Secretary
could not exercise his discretion arbitrarily. This, by implication, ac-
knowledged that in the area reasonably related to foreign affairs on the
political level the Secretary has absolute discretion which is not re-
viewable.18
Other cases appealing passport denials were disposed of on pro-
cedural or other grounds that are not relevant here.1
on an analogy to the right of interstate travel cited in Williams v. Fears, 179
U.S. 270 (1900). Until recently there was argument as to whether such a right
should be based on the first or the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court in the
instant case resolved the arguments by stating that such a right exists and that
it is an element of "liberty" protected by the fifth amendment. 357 U.S. at 125-27.
18 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-.142 (1958). Sections 51.135-.136 establish the substan-
tive grounds for denial. The following sections provide for administrative pro-
cedure, including the establishment of the Board of Passport Appeals. Section
51.142 provides that at any stage of the process of application or appeal the applicant
may be required to execute under oath as part of the application a statement as
to past and present membership in the Communist party. This requirement has
figured prominently in several cases herein discussed.
225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
In the similar case of Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the
court held that denial of a passport to the applicant because he still owed the
State Department for paying his way home previously and because he refused to
show that he was in such financial condition that this would not happen again was
held to be 'arbitrary, since it did not appear to be a test applied to all applicants.
Note that here, as in Shachtinan, the grounds relied on were not in the Secretary's
written regulations.
" Robeson v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 895
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Kent v. Dulles, presenting squarely for the first time the question of
the Secretary's discretionary authority to deny passports, is the first
passport case to reach the Supreme Court since World War 11.20 The
cases of Rockwell Kent, the artist, and Walter Briehl, a psychiatrist,
were combined for this appeal from the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.21 The facts are identical in their important
details. Petitioners applied for passports and were tentatively refused
because of their Communist affiliations. Each refused to execute an
affidavit concerning past or present membership in the Communist party.
Each was accorded an informal hearing and was later informed that in
view of his refusal to execute the affidavit the Board of Passport Appeals
could not give further consideration to his appeal. Each brought suit,
and in each suit summary judgment was awarded the Secretary of State.
On appeal the court of appeals divided, the majority finding that the
Secretary had the statutory authority to deny passports on the grounds
stated and that denial on these grounds was constitutional.
The Supreme Court reversed this decision by a vote of five to four.
It stated without too much discussion that the right to travel is an
element of "liberty" protected by the fifth amendment, so that a citizen
could not be deprived of it without due process of law. The Court found
that the political function of the passport had become subordinate to that
of control over exit so that issuance could no longer be argued to be
within the sole discretion of the Chief Executive. Summarily dismissing
the possibility that the regulation could be made under the war power at
the present time, it concluded that Congress alone had the power to
establish substantive grounds for denial of passports.
Finding no specific delegation of authority by Congress, the Court
considered whether Congress, in legislating on passport regulations, had
by implication made the administrative practice of denying passports to
Communists part of the law. It found that at the time of the 1926 act
grounds for denial had "jelled" into two categories, allegiance to the
United States and participation in illegal conduct.2 2  The Court found
that the grounds in question fell into neither of these categories, and it
(1956) ; Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Dulles v. Nathan, 225
F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955).2 Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958), decided on the same day as Kent,
presented the question of the constitutionality of the use of confidential information
by the Secretary in denying passports. It was disposed of on the grounds stated in
Kent.
"Kent v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d
561 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
22 The first of these is based on a statute. 14 STAT. 54 (1866), as amended,
22 U.S.C. § 212 (1952). As authority for the second the Court cites 3 MooRE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL .LAw § 512 (1906) ; 3 HACKWORTE, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW § 268 (1942); and 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 401 (2d rev.
ed. 1945).
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refused to impute to Congress in passing the 1952 act, making a passport
necessary to travel, a purpose not already clearly established in ad-
ministrative practice.23  It therefore held that the Secretary did not
have the power to deny passports in his sole discretion as he had claimed,
either by the inherent power of the Chief Executive or by congressional
delegation of the power.
The Court explicitly refused to treat the constitutional merits of the
substantive grounds for denial the Secretary had employed, construing
the statutes involved strictly so as to avoid the question. But the whole
decision is written in a context that leaves little doubt but that it
entertains grave misgivings about the constitutionality of these regula-
tions. Its language categorizing the practice of the Secretary of State
as a denial of the right to travel because of political beliefs and associa-
tions24 admits of no other inference.
The minority argued25 that the intent of Congress in passing the
legislation making a passport a prerequisite to travel was to sanction
just such practices as were challenged by the plaintiffs in this case. It
questions the majority's summary dismissal of the applicability of the war
power of the Chief Executive to the present situation. Indeed, it says
that rather than being irrelevant, the war-time practice may be the only
relevant one, since passports are a prerequisite for travel only during
proclaimed periods of war or emergency. It would hold that the war
power would sanction such regulation as is challenged by the plaintiff
in this case. On these grounds the dissenters would affirm the Secre-
tary's power to make such denials.
The logic of the minority seems to the writer sounder than that of
the majority. Yet as a matter of law the result reached by the majority
seems to be the better view under the circumstances. Delegation by
Congress of the power to regulate individual rights should be explicit
and unequivocal. 26 It should not be found in implied ratification of an
administrative practice. In refusing to do so the majority was pursuing
a sound policy.
" The Court relied somewhat on the fact that there was a statute on the books
dealing with issuance of passports to Communists. Internal Security Act of
1950, 64 STAT. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1952). It felt that even though certain
conditions precedent to its becoming operative had not yet been fulfilled, this
statute, in the absence of any other specific legislation on the subject, pre-empted the
field and negated the inference that Congress might have sanctioned any regulation
under the statutes on which the Secretary relied. It would seem that in view of
the fact that the Internal Security Act is a criminal statute, not yet effective, and
not a delegation of restrictive power to the Secretary who issues passports, this
argument is of doubtful validity.21357 U.S. at 130.
2 Ibid.
2 For three excellent examples of such a policy on the part of the Court, see
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953) (House of Representatives
resolution) ; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946) (federal statute);
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1944) (executive order).
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The impact of the decision in Kent on the practical problem of regu-
lating passports is unfortunate. It leaves the Secretary powerless to
deny passports save on the limited grounds approved in that decision.
There is a real and pressing necessity for such regulation.27 The
problem admits of no uncertainty in its solution, for it is vital to the in-
terests of the nation as a whole.
The Communist party openly seeks as its ultimate goal world revolu-
tion; to attribute to it any lesser aim is to ignore the essence of its
existence. We need cite no authority that its machinations are the
greatest concern of our government today. Statements to the effect that
denial of a passport on the basis of membership in the Communist party
or adherence to its cause is denial merely on the basis of "political
beliefs and associations" are open to serious question. It is hoped that
the use of such language by the majority in Kent was inadvertent.
That the exigencies of the moment should be used as grounds for
denial of constitutional rights is contrary to the basic principles of free
government.2 8  But, on the other hand, it must be recognized that there
is a problem that touches on the well-being of the nation, and that there
are citizens whose purposes in going abroad justify their being forced
to forfeit their rights. The problem must be to find some way to
determine, using substantive criteria established by congressional authori-
ty and standard procedures that protect the individual from arbitrary
action, whether the individual in question deserves to forfeit his right
to travel.
E. OSBORNE AYscuE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Little Rock School Litigation-Re-examination
of North Carolina Laws
[T]he Constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against in school admission on grounds of race or color ... can
neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or
state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by
them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted
"ingeniously or ingenuously."'
With these words, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron2 emphati-
" This necessity is evidenced by the fact that several days after this decision
was handed down the President sent a message to Congress urging legislation
delegating the power to regulate to the Secretary. It read in part: "I wish to
emphasize the urgency of the legislation I have recommended. Each day and
week that passes without it exposes us to great danger." 104 CoNG. REc. 11849(1958). The Eighty-fifth Congress adjourned without having acted on this problem.
28 Ex parte Endo, 393 U.S. 283 (1944).
1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) quoting from Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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